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Merger Agreements Under Delaware Law-
When Can Directors Change Their Minds?
A. GILCHRIST SPARKS, III*
The 1985 decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in Smith v. Van
Gorkom' is best known for its ultimate holding that the directors of
Trans Union Corporation were personally liable for failing to exercise
due care in considering and approving an arm's length, cash-out merger
with a company affiliated with the Pritzker family. The focus of this
paper is a less dramatic holding in that case, but one which has enduring
practical consequences and is occasionally overlooked even by sophisti-
cated practitioners.
The initial merger agreement at issue in Van Gorkom was approved
on September 20, 1980. On January 26, 1981, shortly before the stock-
holder vote on the merger, the board of Trans Union took occasion to
review all of the facts surrounding the merger known as of that date.
Because the complaint in the Van Gorkom case had already been filed
and discovery had been taken, the review included the information
gleaned in discovery supposedly supporting the plaintiffs' claims of
gross negligence on the part of the Trans Union directors. Following
this review, counsel advised the directors that they could "(a) continue to
recommend to the stockholders that the latter vote in favor of the pro-
posed merger, (b) recommend that the stockholders vote against the
merger, or (c) take no position with respect to recommending the pro-
posed merger and simply leave the decision to stockholders."2 After
considering that advice and the information presented at the meeting, the
board voted to continue to recommend that the stockholders vote in
favor of the proposed merger.
At trial and on appeal, the defendants urged that the time frame for
determining whether director approval of the merger was the product of
an informed business judgment should include the entire four-month
period during which the board considered the matter and that, given the
board's review and deliberations on January 26 (with the benefit of
hindsight that existed at that date), the board's action was not reckless or
* Mr. Sparks is a partner in the Wilmington, Delaware law firm of Morris, Nichols, Arsht &
Tunnell and was litigation counsel for certain parties in a number of the cases discussed herein,
including Smith v. Van Gorkom and Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.
1. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
2. Id. at 886-87 n.30.
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imprudent. The Delaware Supreme Court disagreed, holding that giving
any legal effect to the action taken by the board on January 26 would be
"contrary to the provisions of [8 Del. C.] [section] 251 (b) and basic prin-
ciples of contract law."3
The Supreme Court's holding was premised in part upon its conclu-
sion that, absent a breach by the Pritzker interests, the only contractual
right to terminate the merger reserved by the Trans Union board in the
merger agreement was if Trans Union had, prior to the stockholder vote,
either consummated a merger with a third party or entered into a "defini-
tive" merger agreement with a third party which was more favorable and
for greater consideration than the Pritzker merger.4 Prior to reaching that
conclusion, the Court analyzed the following paragraph in the merger
agreement:
The Board of Directors shall recommend to the stockholders of Trans
Union that they approve and adopt the Merger Agreement ... and to
use its best efforts to obtain the requisite votes therefor. GL acknowl-
edges that Trans Union directors may have a competing fiduciary
obligation to the shareholders under certain circumstances.5
Focusing on the italicized sentence, the Court held that "clearly" it did
not confer a right to terminate the merger agreement. 6
The Court then turned its focus to the legal advice the board
received at its January 26 meeting. The Court held that options (b) and
(c) described above, namely, to recommend that the stockholders vote
against the merger or to take a noncommittal position on the merger and
simply leave the decision to the shareholders, "were not viable or legally
available to the Board under 8 Del. C. [section] 251(b)."'7 The Court
reasoned:
The Board could not remain committed to the Pritzker merger and yet
recommend that its stockholders vote it down; nor could it take a
neutral position and delegate to the stockholders the unadvised deci-
sion as to whether to accept or reject the merger. Under 251(b), the
Board had but two options: (1) to proceed with the merger and the
stockholder meeting, with the Board's recommendation of approval;
or (2) to rescind its agreement with Pritzker, withdraw its approval of
the merger, and notify its stockholders that the proposed shareholder
meeting was canceled .... But the second course of action would
have clearly involved a substantial risk-that the Board would be
faced with suit by Pritzker for breach of contract .... [Under the
3. Id. at 888.
4. Id. at 883. Neither of those termination events had occurred as of the January 26 board
meeting.
5. Id. at 879 (emphasis in original).
6. Id. at 887.
7. Id. at 888.
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merger agreement], the Board's only ground for release from its
agreement with Pritzker was its entry into a more favorable definitive
agreement to sell the Company to a third party. Thus, in reality, the
Board was not "free to turn down the Pritzker proposal" as the Trial
Court found. Indeed, short of negotiating a better agreement with a
third party, the Board's only basis for release from the Pritzker
Agreement without liability would have been to establish fundamen-
tal wrongdoing by Pritzker.8
This holding by the Delaware Supreme Court makes it clear that
under Delaware law there is no implied fiduciary out or trump card per-
mitting a board to terminate a merger agreement before it is sent to a
stockholder vote. In other words, a merger partner may insist upon an
enforceable contract right that a merger be submitted to a vote of the
opposite party's stockholders, even if intervening events make the
merger agreement unattractive as of the date of the stockholder vote. 9
Four years later, in Corwin v. deTrey, the Court of Chancery sum-
marized the rule laid down in Van Gorkom succinctly: "In such a third-
party transaction, the directors of the selling corporation are not free to
terminate an otherwise binding merger agreement just because they are
fiduciaries and circumstances have changed."" ° In Corwin, the court
went on to dismiss a complaint which claimed that, notwithstanding the
absence of a contractual termination right, directors as fiduciaries none-
theless had the right to, and should have, terminated a merger agreement
because market conditions had changed adversely from the time the
merger agreement was executed.
The Delaware Supreme Court's conclusion that there is no implied
"fiduciary out" which permits a board to terminate a merger agreement
before stockholders vote on it is diametrically opposed to the reasoning
of the Nebraska Supreme Court, purportedly applying Delaware law, in
ConAgra, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc. t There the Court concluded that a merger
agreement confers no rights on an acquiror until approved by stockhold-
ers, and that even without a reserved contractual termination right, if a
better offer emerges, directors may invoke their fiduciary duties to
renege on their promise to submit the agreement to a stockholder vote.
In reaching that conclusion, the Nebraska court, while citing Van
Gorkam, failed to address the holding in that case that under Section 251
8. Id. at 888.
9. By the analysis quoted above as well as a cross-reference to it in its opinion, the Supreme
Court specifically rejected Mr. Van Gorkom's erroneous understanding of corporate law that
"directors always have an inherent right, as well as a fiduciary duty, to accept a better offer
notwithstanding an existing contractual commitment by the Board." Id. at 879.
10. Corwin v. deTrey, Del. Ch., C.A. No. 6808, at 8, Berger, V.C. (Dec. 1, 1989) (citation
omitted).
11. 382 N.W.2d 576 (Neb. 1986).
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of the Delaware General Corporation Law a withdrawal of a recommen-
dation and termination of a merger before the stockholder vote would
subject the terminating corporation to contractual liability.' 2
Van Gorkom's holding also means that, absent the simultaneous
exercise of an effective contractual reservation to terminate a merger
before the stockholder vote, a board cannot change its recommendation
to stockholders that the merger be approved. This conclusion follows
from the Delaware Supreme Court's apparent reading of section 251 of
the Delaware General Corporation Law as containing a "recommenda-
tion" requirement which it assumes must stay in place so long as the
merger agreement has not been terminated. As a result, the option of
reserving a right to withdraw a recommendation in a merger agreement
is, to borrow the Delaware Supreme Court's language, "not legally
available" unless the board also reserves the correlative right to
terminate.
Initially, Van Gorkom's holding that directors who have approved a
merger agreement without a reserved right to terminate before the stock-
holders' meeting must continue to "recommend" the merger, although
the merger terms are no longer viewed by the directors as beneficial to
the shareholders, would appear to conflict with the more recent holding
of the Delaware Supreme Court in Paramount Communications Inc. v.
QVC Network Inc. t3 There, the court held that merger provisions which
purport to require a board to act or not to act in such a fashion as to limit
the exercise of fiduciary duties are invalid, unenforceable, and vest no
contract rights in the merger partner.' 4 This holding was made with spe-
cific reference to a no-shop provision and a stock option agreement
which the court concluded were improperly designed to deter potential
bidders for Paramount in violation of the Paramount directors' fiduciary
duty, first announced in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hold-
12. On the other hand, the Delaware Supreme Court's decision is consistent with that of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Jewel Cos. v. Pay Less Drug Stores Northwest, Inc., 741 F.2d
1555 (9th Cir. 1984), holding under California law that a board may, consistent with its fiduciary
duties, enter into an "exclusive" merger agreement obligating it to hold a stockholders' meeting to
consider a merger and to refrain from negotiating or accepting another merger proposal prior to
that meeting. However, the Jewel court expressly declined to decide the specific question,
seemingly resolved as a matter of Delaware law in Van Gorkom, of whether, upon the unsolicited
receipt of a more favorable offer after signing a merger agreement, the board still must
recommend to its shareholders that they approve the initial proposal. Id. at 1564, n.13. Cf. Belden
Corp. v. InterNorth, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that, under New York
law, a merger agreement may "give [ ] Belden [the acquiring firm] an unequivocal right to receive
the performance of Crouse's [the target firm] management, i.e., Belden is entitled to have the
merger presented and recommended to Crouse's shareholders").
13. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
14. Id. at 51.
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ings, Inc.,15 to obtain the best value reasonably available for stockhold-
ers in a sale of a company. 6
However, given the Delaware Supreme Court's emphasis on direc-
tors' fiduciary duty of complete disclosure in the merger context, 17 it
must be assumed that, if asked, the Delaware Supreme Court would con-
clude that a merger agreement provision which precludes directors from
freely communicating to stockholders material facts concerning a
merger for which their approval is sought is invalid., Thus, one must
reconcile the contractual right of an acquiror to insist that a merger "rec-
ommendation" to stockholders remain in place despite a negative change
of circumstances with the directors' fiduciary duty to disclose all mate-
rial facts to stockholders in connection with a merger vote.
As a matter of theory, and consistent with the thrust of the Dela-
ware Supreme Court's reasoning, one can best view the "recommenda-
tion"'19 requirement read into the merger statute in Smith v. Van Gorkom
not as a disclosure requirement, but instead as a requirement that, at the
time a merger agreement is approved by directors, they must also sub-
stantively endorse the transaction, as distinguished from merely passing
it on to stockholders for their consideration. So viewed, the "recommen-
dation" is an integral part of the statutory approval process and speaks as
of the date the directors initially approve the merger agreement under
the statutory scheme. The holding that, absent a contract right to termi-
nate the merger agreement, the "recommendation" cannot be rescinded
before the stockholder vote without breaching the merger agreement is,
under this reading of Van Gorkom, no more than a recognition of the
acquiror's right as a matter of contract to secure the first-step board
approval under section 251 of the Delaware General Corporation Law
and proceed to a stockholders' meeting.
Thus, if it is the law of Delaware that in order for a merger agree-
ment to reach stockholders it must be accompanied by a director recom-
mendation, then the directors cannot subvert their promise to submit the
agreement for stockholder approval simply by withdrawing their recom-
15. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
16. Interestingly, Chancellor William T. Allen has described Van Gorkom as "an early and, as
of its date, not yet fully rationalized, 'Revlon' or 'change in control' case." Gagliardi v. Trifoods
Int'l. Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 n.4 (Del. Ch. 1996).
17. See, e.g., Arnold v. Society for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994).
18. See also Jewel Cos. v. Pay Less Drug Stores Northwest, 741 F.2d 1555, 1564 (1984)
("Even after the merger agreement is signed a board may not, consistent with its fiduciary
obligations to its shareholders, withhold information regarding a potentially more attractive
competing offer.").
19. The term "recommendation" does not appear in 8 Del. C. § 251, which provides only that
directors must "adopt a resolution approving an agreement of merger" and that it be submitted to
the stockholders."
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mendation. Such a reading is also consistent with the concept that the
board's statutory "approval" obligations are complete as of the time that
execution of the merger agreement is authorized. Further, this view
avoids a direct conflict with the board's clear fiduciary obligation to
keep shareholders advised of material facts, both positive and negative,
that may arise prior to any subsequent solicitation of shareholder
approval of the merger.
As a matter of practice, the tension between the continuing "recom-
mendation" requirement and the fiduciary duty of full disclosure can be
addressed by proxy statement disclosures that leave the technical "rec-
ommendation" in place, but advise shareholders of material develop-
ments occurring after the signing of the merger agreement which
stockholders should also consider in determining how to vote.2° Such
disclosures, while potentially somewhat clumsy and prolix, should not
give rise to contractual liability to the merger partner by reason of the
principle announced in QVC precluding enforcement of merger agree-
ment provisions having the effect of preventing directors from fulfilling
their fiduciary duties-a principle which should effectively preclude any
interpretation of a merger agreement that would bar directors from fulfil-
ling their fiduciary duty of disclosure.21
Under Van Gorkom, the board recommendation of a merger, which
the Delaware Supreme Court has held to be a requirement of section 251
of the Delaware General Corporation Law, cannot be withdrawn before
a shareholder vote without terminating the merger agreement itself,
which in turn can only be accomplished if the merger agreement specifi-
cally reserves that right. However, this linking of the merger agreement
and the directors' recommendation should be seen as a technical require-
ment. While it may produce somewhat schizoid proxy statement lan-
guage, it should not be interpreted as preventing directors from
communicating to stockholders any material facts arising after the exe-
cution of the merger agreement, whether positive or negative-includ-
ing that a better offer has come along. Nonetheless, to increase certainty
in the law and simplify disclosures, the Delaware Supreme Court should
take the earliest opportunity to make clear that the references to "recom-
20. By comparison, the federal securities laws require a company that receives a tender offer
to determine whether to recommend the offer to its stockholders and to communicate the
company's position and any change in that position to stockholders. See Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, Rule 14e-2, 17 C.F.R. 240.14e-2, and Schedule 14D-9, 17 C.F.R. S 240.14D-9.
21. See also Great Western Producers Coop. v. Great Western United Corp., 613 P.2d 873
(Colo. 1980) (applying Delaware law) (holding that the contractual obligation to use their "best
efforts" to obtain shareholder approval of an asset sale is not violated by the directors'
recommendation that shareholders vote against the transaction as the result of a dramatic and
unanticipated increase in the value of the assets between the date of the asset sale agreement and
the shareholder vote).
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mendations" in Van Gorkom refer to the quality of a board's "approval"
of a merger under section 251, and were not intended to inhibit a board
from candidly disclosing to stockholders in a merger proxy statement
any facts or board views arising as a result of changed circumstances
which might be deemed important by shareholders in determining how
to vote on the merger.
The fact that an acquirer may lawfully insist, and require by con-
tract, that a merger proposal be submitted to the target's shareholders
notwithstanding changed circumstances, has practical significance in a
number of settings. First, target corporation directors faced with a
merger which is no longer desirable should either seek to renegotiate or
promptly hold a stockholders' meeting at which the merger will presum-
ably be voted down. They should not cancel the meeting and risk con-
tractual damages.
Second, acquirers may wish to bargain for tight control over the
timing of the targets' shareholder meeting so as to maximize the value of
the right to have it called. They should also obtain any agreements to
vote for the merger or proxies, particularly irrevocable proxies, which
may be secured so as to enhance the likelihood of a favorable stock-
holder vote.22
Finally, and most importantly, the fact that Delaware merger law
implies no fiduciary outs and Van Gorkom makes clear that such an
"out" must be clearly stated to be effective places specific burdens on
the transactional lawyer to fashion effective termination provisions if a
post-agreement market check is desired as a business matter or required
by Revlon and its progeny.
22. This raises the interesting question of whether stockholders, particularly those with
arguably controlling positions, should bargain for the same kind of fiduciary out in voting
agreements, including stock options and irrevocable proxies, that directors will want in the merger
agreement.
1997]
